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abstract
Realising the vision of pervasive healthcare will generate new challenges to system
security. Such challenges are fundamentally different from issues and problems that we
face in centralised approaches as well as non-clinical scenarios. In this paper, we reﬂect
upon our experiences in the HealthAgents project wherein a prototype system was
developed and a novel approach employed that supports data transfer and decision
making in human brain tumour diagnosis and treatment. While the decision making needs
to rely on different clinical expertise, the HealthAgents system leveraged a domain
ontology to align different sub-domain vocabularies and we have experimented with
a process calculus to glue together distributed services. We examine the capability of the
Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC), a process calculus based language, in meeting
security challenges in pervasive settings, especially in the healthcare domain. The key
difference in approach lies in making the representational abstraction reﬂect the relative
autonomy of the various clinical specialisms involved in contributing to patient manage-
ment. The scope within LCC of accommodating Boolean-valued constraints allows for
ﬂexible integration of heterogeneous sources in multiple formats, which are characteristic
features of a pervasive healthcare environment.
ª 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction and motivation
‘‘The most profound technologies are those that disappear.
They weave themselves into the fabric of everyday life until
they are indistinguishable from it’’. This is Mark Weiser’s
vision (Weiser, 2001) of how technologies might eventually
blend in with our surroundings. Projecting this vision on to
healthcare gives a picture wherein ‘‘smart’’ software agents
would act on behalf of human specialists in collecting/moni-
toring critical life support data, extracting information from
the data, jigsawing information/data together, and eventually
enabling decisions and actions to be taken on the outcome of
such processes. One of the most far-reaching consequences of
such a vision is the emergence of a different paradigm of
patient care – pervasive healthcare. Currently, a person
experiencing a perceptible ailment invokes the ‘‘patient-
seeing-doctor’’ pattern, where a doctor is often an array of
specialists. Instead, the new healthcare paradigm emphasises
a degree of continuous medical surveillance, with key deci-
sions for medical follow-ups requiring automated processing,
and in a decentralised manner.
One of the fundamental questions concerning pervasive
healthcare is how to ensure the data are delivered to the right
person at the right moment. Thus far, knowledge in health-
care, to some extent, remains a ‘‘cottage industry’’ with
largely tacit knowledge only explicit to isolated specialists,
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of collaboration has been recognised, there is little systematic
knowledge sharing of clinical intervention outcomes. With
the advance of modern transportation, communication, and
tele-medicine, patients are no longer restricted by physical
and geographical constraints. In the situation of comorbidity
(e.g. heart disease, AIDS, cancer, diabetes, or mental health), it
is not a surprise to ﬁnd that a patient is examined in one
hospital; his/her case is reviewed by clinicians from another
hospital; and he/she is treated in a third hospital by yet
another group of clinicians due to speciality and availability.
Data about a particular patient might be held by different
departments within one hospital, from different hospitals
and/orevenfrom hospitals locatedindifferentcountries. Data
requests might come from members of a dedicated team
accessing from their ofﬁce or home, members of auditing
committees, interns for educational purposes, and patients
themselves all with different access privileges and access
capabilities. Differences in work idioms in different situations
evidently have the potential to signiﬁcantly impinge on the
quality of services and data security. Apart from the wide
spread in geographic regions and a diverse landscape of users,
the heterogeneity of clinical data is also demonstrated in the
different levels of granularity of domain knowledge, different
nomenclatures used in sub clinical domains, different proto-
cols followed, different levels of details passed on in the form
of medical records, and different standards reinforced by
industrial manufacturers. In such an environment, knowl-
edge which is a prime capital can only be based upon
distributed and heterogeneous data/information sources and
needs to be processed automatically in streaming mode.
Users, therefore, need to locate the correct data providers,
retrieve the most appropriate parts of the exposed data and
glue together all the bits and pieces of information to make
sensible conclusions. In the meantime, one needs to observe
the data integrity and obey the data privacy and ethical
regulations enforced by organisational and national clinical
guidelines and protocols.
The HealthAgents
1 prototype provides us with an ideal
platform to investigate the impacts and implications of
experimenting with semantic-rich data and knowledge
management technologies in a decentralised/pervasive
healthcare system. In practice, a centralised repository gains
credit for its effectiveness, security, and manageability. This is
true as long as patients do not go beyond the catchment area
of a hospital. Centralised solutions become less attractive
when one is injured while visiting another country; when one
needs daily care while on holiday in a retreat cabin; and when
specialists are summoned up from different areas in a tele-
conference to discuss a rare case. Such a list of counterex-
amples could continue whilst they all share the same
characteristics: decentralisation. As illustrated in Fig. 1,i n
a fully pervasive environment, we observe the relative inde-
pendence of each participating agent or intelligent device
which fulﬁls its designated responsibilities, either automati-
cally, semi-automatically or under the supervision of human
experts.
We shall lay out the various information fragments that
are produced by these participating agents and build up
a clinically appropriate and coherent representation of
a patient based on potentially very different views. We
tolerate the diversity and heterogeneity while systematically
choreographing individual information resources so as to
combine their knowledge of a particular patient or a particular
disease. While interactions among individuals play an
important role in engineering together distributed services
underpinning the envisioned healthcare paradigm, security
becomes a major concern when sharing, transferring, and
modifying patient data/proﬁles. Prior to the discussion of the
details of these interaction models and their scientiﬁc back-
ground, security requirements of clinical information systems
are analysed for building up the proper models tailored for the
need of secure interactions within Healthcare Information
System (HIS).
2. Security requirements of healthcare
information systems
We shall, in the beginning, draw distinctions between the
types of threats imposed on healthcare systems and their
likelihood. Though eavesdropping or hacking is a major
concern to computer network security, it is so expensive that
dedicated and capable intruders may consider using a more
convenient way. Actually, 10% of GPs (general practitioners) in
the UK have experienced their computers being physically
stolen (Pitchford and Kay, 1995). More likely, improper use of
the system may lead to privacy leaks, by careless (or mali-
cious) users and when inappropriate privileges being given to
them by the system. A well-designed system should not only
protect the communication sites and end users, but also
carefully authorise users with genuine needs to have access to
selective sharing of information without exposing additional
Fig. 1 – Pervasive healthcare architecture.
1 http://www.healthagents.cat.
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has currently not been well addressed in healthcare infor-
mation systems (Zhang et al., 2002). In this section, we outline
the challenges and common security requirements of
healthcare systems in a distributed environment, where
preserving privacy and maintaining openness are crucial and
information access decisions depend upon role and context.
2.1. The distributed environment of healthcare
information systems
Aggregating dispersed data into large databases is expensive
and practically unfeasible, since geographically different
healthcare centres have to have control over their datasets
and at the same time maintain a globally consistent data
schema. A more important reason to oppose data consolida-
tion is concerned with healthcare data conﬁdentiality. In the
UK, the National Health Service (NHS), driven by the motives
of easier central administration and better information
availability, attempted to build a uniﬁed electronic patient
record system and give access to extended NHS community.
This has been opposed (Anderson, 1996a, 2001) for the reason
that such a system, collecting data from existing GP systems
but out of their control, is in conﬂict with the ethical principle
that no patient should be identiﬁable other than to the GP
without patient consent (Joint Computer Group of the GMSC
and RCGP, 1988) and the result from a survey that most
patients are unwilling to share their information with NHS
(Hawker, 1995). Another objection arises from the over-
whelming workload such a centralised system could possibly
put upon a security ofﬁcer responsible for managing the data
sharing (Zhang et al., 2002).
A distributed healthcare service infrastructure, however,
implies the capability that is required to cope with the
administrative burden and the continuous maintenance
needs arising from fully functional and networked clinical
centres, each of which has its own users, data, access policies,
and which assumes that cross-centre access is the norm. A
distributed environment and its associated dynamics bring
other concerns, such as patient privacy preserving, to the
information-sharing healthcare network.
2.2. Preserving privacy and conﬁdentiality in shared
access
The privacy of patient information is an important issue and
failure to recognise this will lead to risk of patient safety, loss
of public conﬁdence in clinical organisations, and so on
(Denley and Smith, 1999). A fundamental ethical principle
stated by both the EU and the General Medical Council in the
UK is that, patients must consent to data sharing. The British
Medical Association advises that clinical professionals, who
have access to patient conﬁdential information in order to
perform their duties, are responsible for the information they
hold under ethical or professional obligations of conﬁdenti-
ality and shall not use or disclose such information for any
purpose other than the clinical care of the patient to whom it
relates. This means patients shall be assured that they can
trust the access of their information, by a care team within
their treating hospitals or experts involved from collaborative
centres, if any, is safe and accords with their agreement. The
moving from a traditional patient–doctor relationship
towards a modern patient-healthcare service relationship
implies trust in clinical systems must be maintained rather
than reliance on doctor responsibilities. The absence of
a mechanism or policy framework in the interest of infor-
mation governance and conﬁdentiality protection, hence,
may damage the healthcare services aimed to be delivered,
since private information of any individual patient may be
made available by systems to people not directly related with
the care of that patient. This will give opportunities to
potential threats, possibly coming from inside workers, as
well as outside hackers. Such threats include ungraceful
private information disclosure and abuse or even more risky,
incorrect clinical decisions made for vulnerable patients due
to clinical data being wrongly altered, accidentally or delib-
erately. It is worth noting that threats from outside intruding
into the network are much rarer than from inside. The secu-
rity risks tend to increase dramatically, therefore, when an
inter-connected clinical system network is in place which
makes separately stored patient records and clinical infor-
mation easily accessible and lets a wider range of people have
access to them. Appropriate access control to patient records
is the fundamental need for patient privacy and information
security (Denley and Smith, 1999).
2.3. Maintaining an open access
Two aspects of openness must be maintained: 1) open for
joining the system and not preventing any friendly but
previously unknown clinical centre (bringing in its previously
unrecognised users) from accessing information available
across organisational boundaries; 2) open for information
sharing to the network. Conducting healthcare research with
more open use of information (identiﬁable data, etc.) under
legitimate constraints and user acceptance, though not
related with the clinical care directly, advances medical
knowledge and promotes higher quality of healthcare service
in the long run and is welcomed by the society. A clinical
system can beneﬁt most from clinical data as well as patient-
speciﬁc data if such information can be machine-analysed
and digested. The knowledge accumulated can be useful for
later decision makings, particularly for rare but similar cases
encountered in the future, conﬁdential information contained
in cases not being revealed.
2.4. The different access needs to data subsets due to
distinct job nature
The need of distinguishing only the relevant data for sharing
among clinical professionals rather than the whole records
arises from preserving privacy while maintaining open
access. Even if name, address and other privacy information
is removed to produce a seemingly anonymised record, an
NHS clinician can easily identify a patient by the NHS
number and they must be able to do so to perform their
jobs. Therefore, it is sensible to grant access permission to
particular record parts on the basis of users’ expertise. This
expertise determines their actual needs of access, to the
data parts they routinely work with and by doing so,
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medical records or reports may be sent to a pathologist
involved in a patient’s care; prescription sent to a pharma-
cist; and sensitive parts not sent out at all. A specialist may
have more control over their own partitions, e.g. write their
reports or order certain tests, but limited permissions to
other specialists’ partitions or even not at all, e.g. to very
sensitive medical test results.
2.5. The access policies and principles pertinent to
patients as individuals
It is not rational to allow a professional to have access to all
patient records, even if limited to the data subset ﬁtting his/
her expertise. Only relevant clinicians who have real life
relationships with patients in clinical centres should access
their records. This is documented in British Medical Associa-
tion’s security policy principles for clinical information
systems (Anderson, 1996a), and the feasibility of adopting it
has been evidenced in Denley and Smith (1999). Two major
principles areas follows.
Principle of Access: ‘‘Each identiﬁable clinical record shall be
marked with an access control list naming the people or
groups of people who may read it and append data to it. The
system shall prevent anyone not on the access control list
from accessing the record in any way.’’
Principle of Control: ‘‘One of the clinicians on the access
control list must be marked as being responsible. Only she
may alter the access control list, and she may only add other
healthcare professionals to it.’’
A named responsible clinician, possibly a patient GP, as in
the UK or a primary care physician (PCP), as in the US, may
setup a workgroup including the specialists who together
deliver healthcare to the patient. According to the Principle of
Access, it is the members of this group who will be in the
patient access control list, as used by RBAC for ﬁles (Sandhu
et al., 1996), have access to a subset of data they are respon-
sible for, reﬂecting their job nature. The one who sets up the
workgroup will let the system know the group members and
their roles in the group, in accord with the Principle of Control.
This implies a data ownership. Such a scheme decentralises
management burden and increases scalability. The distrib-
uted environment and open access requirements suggest that
a named doctor may involve specialists from other sites
(remote consultants, temporary attending physicians, etc.)
into healthcare procedures. For example, a medical opinion
requested on a surgical patient may require a medical regis-
trar, from other directorates, to exercise override access to
that patient’s notes (Denley and Smith, 1999). This is related
with delegation (Zhang et al., 2002). Essentially, a responsible
doctorgrantsaccess to local or remoteusers fromtrusted sites
and occasionally, someone acts on their behalf, implying
ownership transfer. A triangle relationship is described in
Calam: a patient is associated with a workgroup, of which
a user is a member, so that a user is permitted access via the
workgroup to patient (‘‘self-claimed’’ or ‘‘colleague-granted’’/
delegation).
3. Enhancing security in distributed
healthcare
In fulﬁlling the requirements discussed in the previous
section, we investigated a process calculus based messaging
service that allows us to fragment and distribute clinical
guidelines and protocols and a high-level knowledge repre-
sentation paradigm to address knowledge/semantics inter-
operability issues. In the following, we ﬁrst review existing
approaches aiming at secure pervasive healthcare environ-
ments. We continue with a layered model and a brief discus-
sion of its enabling technologies.
3.1. Security domains and existing security solutions
Security can be assured in different levels, operating systems,
database systems, and applications. Some operating systems
which take serious concerns of security include: OpenBSD,
TrustedBSD, Trusted Solaris, Active Directory (as part of
Microsoft Windows), and SELinux. Security-Enhanced Linux,
or SELinux, is a Linux feature that provides a variety of secu-
rity policies in the Linux kernel. It provides utilities to incor-
porate a strong, ﬂexible mandatory access control (FMAC)
architecture into the major subsystems of the kernel. In 2006,
U.K. Cabinet Ofﬁce backed SELinux and did experimental use
ofitto providesecuresystemaccessfortheNHS’snewﬁnance
system. Database security is the system, processes, and
procedures that protect a database from unintended activity.
Authentication, authorisation, auditing, and intrusion detec-
tion mechanisms are considered common database security
measures. We will focus in this paper, however, the applica-
tion level security where information sharing and resource
access through the HealthAgents system must be under
proper control. Access control at the operating system level
provides the protection of ‘‘whose data is to be protected from
whom’’ and a protection mechanism is the manner by which
the operating system enforces the access control to its users.
Access control at the HealthAgents system level requires the
application to be designed in such a way that it recognises
valid users, possibly from one site, and allow them to access
resources, possibly from another site, under system-level
constraints and mutually agreed policies between both sites,
within an inter-connected network. This design provides an
additional assurance on top of what will be secured in the
operating system level and database system level, which must
have been offered in the existing and standard environment
but not under our control.
Two earlier access control models are discretionary access
control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC). DAC is an
access policy determined by the owner of an object. MAC is an
access policy determined by the system, not the owner. An
access control list (ACL), a list of permissions attached to an
object, can be used by both models and applied in operating
systems such as Windows. A newer access control model that
supports efﬁcient management is the widely accepted US
National Institute of Standards and Technology model of role-
based access control (RBAC) (Sandhu et al., 1996). All these
models can be applied in the operating system level as well as
the application level. Since no operating system can
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of a suitable model for the system under consideration is
required. In RBAC, permissions that describe operations upon
resources areassociatedwithroles. Usersare assigned to roles
to gain permissions that allow them to perform particular job
functions. Privileges may be calculated as follows (M-Tech
Information Technology, Inc., 2006):
Privileges ¼ User Role   Role Definition
þ Rules FunctionðUser AttributesÞ
In addition to the static collection of rights accumulated by
roles, a user can dynamically achieve extra rights if they
expose certain attributes as deﬁned by rules. This model is
efﬁcient when many users require the same set of rights in an
organisation but otherwise unmanageable or even useless
when roles vary in different conditions under which users act.
In a hospital, roles can be deﬁned for a number of classiﬁed
groups to aggregate permissions, e.g. consultant, radiologist,
nurse, who have static job functions. However, dynamic
contexts exist in role playing, e.g. patients may be additionally
assigned to or removed from a list for which a named doctor is
responsible and this inﬂuences this doctor’s role in caring
these patients. RBAC has difﬁculties to capture such security-
relevant contexts as patient, location, and time in healthcare
environment (Zhang et al., 2002). Patient–doctor relationship
is identiﬁed as a critical clinical security constraint to record
access, described in Section 2.
The Community Authorisation Service (CAS) (Pereira et al.,
2006) provides a solution to the management of user access
control within Virtual Organisations (VOs) spanning over
multiple sites in the Grid environment. It breaks the tradition
of requiring each resource provider to maintain the mapping
of individual users (across VOs) to its local database roles in
order to authorise access to its resources. Using CAS, user
memberships areinsteadbasedonVO rolesand localresource
providers only need to map these to local database roles. This
dramatically reduces the number of mapping entries across
resource providers and the duplicated maintenance burden
put on them once a new user joins or a current user privilege
changes. Such an approach requires no global user repository.
However, a presumption of using the approach, as it is in
RBAC, is that a large number of users can be grouped into
several role groups requiring certain access levels in involved
organisations. For the same reason that RBAC is infeasible to
address the clinical requirement that information access or
travelling may alter from patient to patient and user led as
stated in the Principle of Access, the CAS is encountered with
similar difﬁculties. Suppose clinicians A and B with the same
speciality are from hospitals P and Q respectively. They will be
categorised into the same VO role and the same access rights
to data in P and Q. But in reality A shall have more privileges
than B to certain data, e.g. of patients in P under A0s care, and
vice versa for B0s privileges in Q.
Managing a resource access model is complex where there
is a large number and various types of users, resource items,
and access policies, user responsibilities being dynamic and
ownership being distributed. The common practice of simply
deﬁning roles that aggregate all permissions required for the
collection of resources to complete tasks is not realistic due to
the diversity of individual needs which literally entails each
individual having a distinct role. Even the burden of deﬁning
and maintaining a proper set of access control policies based
onrolesforautomatingauthorisation couldbe considerable. A
security solution must be able to cope with the complexity.
3.2. Overview of a layered security model
It has been pointed out that healthcare systems should be
designed with multilateral security rather than multilevel
security (Anderson, 1996b). Unlike some military systems
which prevent information ﬂow ‘‘down’’ from top secret to
secret then to conﬁdential, healthcare systems usually
prevent information ﬂow ‘‘across’’ from one clinician to
another or from one hospital to another. This is evidenced by
the requirements outlined in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5
where different access needs to cases and case partitions are
distinguished due to distinct job responsibilities.
However, we argue a multilevel security model is more
manageable, task availability beingin thetop level control and
resource availability to tasks in lower level control. A multi-
lateral security model resides in the lower level and comple-
ments the multilevel security model. The assignment of tasks
to users is a business decision to be made by stakeholders,
possibly explicitly in rules. It is sensible to regard the acces-
sibility to tasks the organisational privileges with which
organisation seniority is related and access to business func-
tions restricted. Since tasks already exist in organisations and
are routinely performed by speciﬁc user groups, they help to
functionally decompose the system and ease security
management. If a user can perform a speciﬁc type of task,
then there must be certain resource items available to him/
her to load into the task, if not all. Without the context of
accomplishing one or more tasks in different privilege levels,
information access makes no sense. The rationale of using
a combined multilevel and multilateral model is further sup-
portedby thefactthata job responsibilityis determined bythe
level of authority and the division of work (Crook et al., 2002).
The former prevents information ﬂow downwards and the
latter prevents information ﬂow across, being concerned
about workgroup membership and job speciality under our
further reﬁnement. This forms a layered security architecture
that addresses the healthcare security requirements.
1) Privilege of performing various types/levels of tasks and
executing associated interaction models is determined by
job title or grade/level. Users may upgrade their job titles
occasionally and this is managed locally. Semantics of job
titles and task collections must be globally deﬁned and
agreed among organisations.
2) Privilege of loading case instances for performing tasks (or
enactment of interaction models) is determined by real life
workgroup memberships or job boundary. This is managed
by the locally named doctors, who shall be ﬂagged as
owners in case records’ access control lists.
3) Privilege of accessing case record partitions (e.g. patient
data, biopsy data, Microarray data, MRI and MRS data,
diagnosis data, therapy data, surgery data, etc.) is deter-
mined by job nature or specialist one takes on in hospitals
(e.g. oncologist, pathologist, radiologist, surgeon, etc.). This
computers & security 29 (2010) 331–349 335is managed by system administrators when the account is
setup and is maintained at a high level of stability.
This layered architecture can be seen as a hybrid of three
different types of access control models that have been
developed historically, DAC, MAC, and RBAC, as being deﬁned
and discussed in Section 3.1. Layer 1 of the architecture is
a type of MAC, it is the system that constraints the subject to
do various tasks, depending upon the actual level of that
subjectin theorganisation. Layer2 of thearchitectureis a type
of DAC, it is the owner of the case records, or the named
doctor, to restrict the access to the records based upon the
identity of subjects or memberships to which they belong.
Layer 3 of the architecture is a type of RBAC, it is the clinical
job functions or roles that determine one’s particular access
privilege.
Thus, a user’s overall privileges will be the sum of the
user’s access privileges in all tasks that the user is involved in
(being a policy), each of which is decided by the particular
cases he/she can operate as a workgroup member to deliver
healthcare service (being afact upon interaction instantiation)
at the time of performing tasks, which in turn will be con-
strained by the accessible case partitions as determined by
user professional roles (being a fact).
User Privileges¼
P
(Privileged Interaction Model Type Selection *
User Privileges in Interaction Model)
User Privileges in Interaction Model¼Interaction Model Function
(User Privileges on Cases)
User Privileges on Cases¼User Workgroup Membership * (User
Professional Role * Role Deﬁnition)
/
User Privileges¼
P
(InteractionModel Set as determinedby job level
* Interaction Model’s Operational Cases as determined by job
boundary * Case Subset as determined by job nature)
Alternatively, the following meta-rule determines the
prerequisite a user exercises privileges: a user has a title above
the one required for running an interaction model, can load
a case, that is under the care of a workgroup which the user is
a member of, and perform operations on the case parts the
user’s specialists allow.
user_privilege (user, im, case, part, operation) )
job_title(user, title1) & executable(title2, im) &
above(title1, title2) &member(user, workgroup) &
responsible(workgroup, patient) & own(patient, case) &
job_specialist(user, specialist) & rights(specialist, part, op)
Instances of this meta-rule include, a user can perform the
operation of classifying case tumour types under their care,
but not update the case proﬁle (report, test, surgery, etc.) not
in their specialist areas. Certain parts of the case, e.g. diag-
nosis results and treatment plans, may be updated by only
a named doctor.
IF
userA. responsiblePatientList. contains (patientB) &
userA. specialiseIn (clinicalData. areaC) & areaC!¼areaD
THEN
userA. candoClassify (patientB. clinicalData)¼¼true &
userA. canUpdate (patientB. clinicalData. areaD)¼false
It is evident that any mechanism materialising the above
multi-layered security model should facilitate the following.
The ﬁrst division, job-division, is based on job title which is
normally enforced by healthcare providers to ensure
a proper managerial chain and reporting hierarchy. Nurses
naturally need to access different data than general practi-
tioners and speciality registrars to carry out their duty.
Either too much or too less data would render their effort
sub-optimal or even futile. The second division, speciality
division, is vertically among different specialities. As the
medical domain is further divided, nowadays, neurosur-
geons normally do not interpret biopsy slides directly which
falls into the speciality of histopathologists. The third divi-
sion, assignment division, is based on individual assign-
ment. Each clinical staff has his/her own task-load. Unless
there is a particular request, we assume that clinical staff do
not normally have access to those cases that are not
assigned to them directly. These three division inspire us to
adopt a representation paradigm for capturing the security
rules that focuses more on individuals’ responsibilities than
the actual persons carrying out such responsibilities. In the
meantime, when searching for a proper formalism, we also
need to bear in mind that in a distributed environment,
applying rules is not straightforward. With more than one
organisation involved in patient treatment and post-treat-
ment management, centralised rule base is not strictly
applicable. Fragmenting and allocating security rules to the
concerned parties calls for new rule capturing paradigm.
Combined with the division requests, this immediately
suggests to us to take a process oriented view for system
design and analysis. The formalism we use in the applica-
tion is the Lightweight Coordination Calculus, LCC (Rob-
ertson, 2004) which is a logic programming language based
on the low-level speciﬁcation of something akin to Calculus
of Communicating Systems (CCS) (Milner, 1980) or Pi-
calculus (Milner et al., 1992). In pervasive healthcare envi-
ronments, there is no single locus of control of task execu-
tion. Instead of the other resources existing merely to serve
the control unit, these entities lead an autonomous exis-
tence and only undergo message induced transitions upon
opening up access to each other – centralised control gives
way to concurrent processes wherein each party accom-
plishes the tasks allocated to it and expose the results to
accommodate the requests from the others. LCC prescribes
concerned parties by specifying their responsibilities.
Communication among different parties is regulated
through messaging.
With the representation and rule capturing formalisms
deﬁned, we have to speculate on the rule reinforcement. A
distributed environment introduces interoperability issues.
On the one hand, different individuals participating in a data
exchange task might maintain very different local vocabu-
laries making a set of well-crafted rules invalid or falsely
applied. On the other hand, the application of rules might
result in a change of an individual’s local knowledge by acting
upon the status of a number of entities, e.g. the data that one
possesses, the accessibility that one has on a particular part of
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reﬂect and make explicit such changes becomes challenging
when both data and data access are distributed. In order to
address these two issues, in HealthAgents, we leverage
a domain ontology as the common referencing point against
which local views and vocabularies are juxtaposed. Rules,
coded in LCC, are written in terms of the HealthAgents
domain ontology and are interpreted thereafter. Rule
segmentation and distribution is enabled by mechanisms
native to LCC. We also propose using the Conceptual Graph
(CG) based scheme to unify local views and offer a ‘‘reason-
able’’ and ‘‘knowledgeable’’ interface to local data. Repre-
senting in CGs, apparently isolated data ‘‘islands’’ are inter-
connected together, waving into a landscape of one integral
data network. Rule propagation and reinforcement among
individual data holders subsequently can be carried out
smoothly and seamlessly.
3.3. Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC) and secure
interaction models
LCC, originally proposed in Robertson (2005), is a process
calculus for specifying coordination among multiple partici-
pants. It does so by clearly stating what role an individual
plays in a messaging process and thus what responsibilities
that an individual should fulﬁl when interacting with others.
An LCC model is built upon the principle that role-playing
agents should obey the laws and/or protocols that are
explicitly speciﬁed against the roles that such agents are
expected to take. LCC ensures the fulﬁlment of roles by indi-
viduals through regulating the message-ﬂows among them.
These include: the messages that should be sent and are
expected to be received and what constraints should be
satisﬁed before a message can be handled. The full picture of
LCC syntax is speciﬁed in Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF)
as shown in Fig. 2.
In an LCC interaction model, we use predicate a() to specify
the role that an individual is playing, 0 and * to specify the
direction of message ﬂow, and ) for constraints. Term and
Constant are implementation-speciﬁc. In the current version,
Term is a well-formed formula in Prolog logic programming
language and Constant is a Prolog constant starting with
a lowercase letter. LCC also provides constructs for parallel
(par), sequential (then), and switch branching (or) controls.
Interpreting LCC is tantamount to unpack LCC clauses,
ﬁnding the next tasks that it is permitted to perform and
updating the status of an interaction accordingly. A set of
clause rewriting rules are introduced to ensure LCC constructs
are interpreted in a consistent manner (Robertson, 2004). Let
Ci be an LCC clause from a model M; Ii be a set of received
messages currently queuing for an individual participating in
an M-based interaction; Ciþ1 be the unfolded new LCC clause;
Iiþ1 3Ii be the set of remaining unprocessed messages; and Oi
be the outgoing messages generated when processing Ci.A n
LCC model is interpreted by exhaustively unfolding clauses as
detailed in Robertson (2004) to produce the following
sequence:
C1 /
I1;I2;M;O1 C2; .; Ci /
Ii;Iiþ1;M;Oi
Ciþ1; .; Cn 1 /
In 1;In;M;On 1 Cn;
The interpretation of LCC constraints depends on a partic-
ular implementation. In this paper, we assume Prolog as the
underlying programming language and thus interpret the
constraints in terms of a Prolog logic program. Nevertheless,
this by no means denies the possibility of implementing LCC
constraints with other programming languages, such as Java.
Pooling together the rewriting rules for LCC-speciﬁc
constructs and the interpretation of a Prolog program, we
obtain the semantics of LCC models.For instance,in the above
LCC interaction model, the sequence construct then is
unfolded by examining the ﬁrst part of the sequence or, if it is
closed (i.e. executed), unfolding the next part. After unfolding,
the system tries to instantiate all the variables (e.g. P and A)t o
examine the satisfy-ability of LCC clauses. A narrative inter-
pretation of the LCC model in Fig. 3, therefore, reads ‘‘when an
on-call-doctor receives a routine check request on a patient
(P), he/she ﬁrst asks an arbitrary nurse (S ) to take P’s body
temperature. When the body temperature is done, he/she
asks an arbitrary nurse (T ) to take P’s blood sample if P has not
been givenblood test before.’’ Note that whether nurse S and T
are the same person is unknown from the context.
LCC lays down a nice framework wherein authentication,
authorisation, data integrity and data encryption issues can
be seen as constraints and message passing sequence among
different parties. The role-playing nature of LCC interaction
Fig. 2 – Grammar of LCC.
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behaviour-specifying LCC clauses (as demonstrated in Fig. 3
deﬁning the responsibility of an on-call-doctor). Security rules
are then imposed on whoever is committed to fulﬁl these
responsibilities. In the meantime, assignment division is
enforced by treating different instantiations of an interaction
model as independent cases. The clear separation between
models and instances ensure that security rules only take
effective on an instance and thus clinical staff ‘‘playing’’ in an
instance. Finally, the speciality division can be implemented
either explicitly through prescribing the behaviour of a role or
indirectly in LCC Constraints. Synchronising through message
passing ensure autonomy and transparency of role-playing
individuals and in the same time provide systematic check-
points that whether everyone fulﬁls his/her duty or whether
a security constraint is properly checked and satisﬁed.
Here is an exemplar data transferring interaction model.
Upon receiving a request of patient’s data, one might check
whether the data requester is what he/she claims to be by
asking for an authentication message, whether the data
requester has the privilege to view the entire patient record or
part of it by looking up the access policy associated with his/
her ID, etc. Fig. 4 illustrates fragments of an LCC interaction
model that retrieves data based on the request submitted by
an arbitrary domain specialist. It is evident that whether or
not a particular specialist is qualiﬁed to receive the requested
data can be crafted as data-speciﬁc evaluation using is_quali-
ﬁed (E, Patient). Meanwhile, this example interaction model
also emphasises on the customisation of data transfer
methods. We use trans_method (E, M ) to state that the data
transfer task is speciﬁc to a particular specialist.
The running of all above example LCC model speciﬁcation
for healthcare can be supported by the Openknowledge
(Robertson et al., 2006) kernel. Next, we use LCC for the
modelling of the HealthAgents system. The clinical decision
support system has been implemented and tested, within the
HealthAgents project. In this paper, we explore the use of LCC
models in bringing better knowledge sharing capabilities for
healthcare professionals in a decision support system and at
the same time enforce better access control. The system
prototypehasbeenbuilt and itispartofourfuture worktotest
the use of the developed Openknowledge kernel for the
HealthAgents system.
4. Security in HealthAgents:
a comprehensive case study
In this section, we present in-depth details of the Health-
Agents system, the elicitation of interaction models, and their
secure running in our layered security model for distributed
healthcare applications. Meanwhile, as discussed in the
previous section, our vision in secure pervasive healthcare
systems relies on a mutual understanding of the case at hand.
We elaborate an ontology and a conceptual graph based
mechanism that work alongside with LCC interaction models.
4.1. HealthAgents architecture and the aimed secure
system access logic
The HealthAgents system (Fig. 5) is a distributed decision
support system that supports diagnosis and prognosis,
employs a set of distributed nodes that either store patient
case data, build classiﬁers that are trained upon case data and
capable of classifying tumour types, or use classiﬁers for the
diagnosis and prognosis of brain tumours. The magnetic
resonance spectroscopy (MRS) data used by the system is built
up using anonymous information from child and adult cases.
Classiﬁers are created by the producer nodes that receive
requests from the clinicians to generate classiﬁers for partic-
ular tumours. Clinicians with cases will employ classiﬁers to
assist in the diagnosis of patients for particular tumours. The
HealthAgents system consists of a variety of agents each
charged with a different task. A more detailed description of
the HealthAgents components and architecture can be found
in Xiao et al. (2008). For the need of open access (a requirement
Fig. 3 – An example of LCC.
Fig. 4 – Ultrasound result evaluation.
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should be minimised while resource availability maximised.
This is achieved in HealthAgents via using classiﬁers.
Knowledge extracted from cases is implicitly involved for
decision making. Classiﬁers are developed and trained from
relevant cases and classiﬁers instead of the actual cases will
be used for facilitating the diagnosis decisions on cases
coming up subsequently, the case proﬁle statistics for training
classiﬁers being referred for classiﬁer selection. The Health-
Agents can thus achieve its goal of facilitating brain tumour
diagnosis by using the distributed knowledge base without
compromising privacy.
When a user logs in, a patient case is retrieved and then,
relevant classiﬁers will be invoked, after that the classiﬁcation
is performed upon the case and ﬁnally, the diagnosis results
updated as well as the ranking of involved classiﬁers. Such
a procedure for performing a task is as follows.
1) User account setup and his/her professional specialist and
interaction model availability binding (preparation).
2) Login and authentication (locally).
3) User ID and task availability matching, accessible interac-
tion model presentation.
4) User functional role determination and playing in
a selected interaction model.
5) A set of cases the user is responsible for will be made
available, presented and selected for interaction model
execution.
6) A subset of case records may be visible and of manipula-
bility to the user during the performance of the task.
7) Speciﬁc local policies may apply to add extra constraints to
the particular access.
4.2. Building an interaction model hierarchy with a goal-
decomposition graph
Four major interaction models, as shown in Fig. 6, are iden-
tiﬁed: create classiﬁer, execute existing classiﬁer, update
classiﬁer reputation value, and update case proﬁle. They are
elaborated as four sub-goals under the root goal of ‘‘tumour
type diagnosis’’ via a goal-decomposition graph, useful for
requirements analysis and interaction model identiﬁcation. A
detailed goal decomposition procedure and underpinning
process elicitation can be found in Xiao and Greer (2009).
Table 1 describes a speciﬁc branch of the graph, where
‘‘Tumourtypediagnosis’’includes‘‘Updatecaseproﬁle’’which
inturnincludes‘‘Classifycase’’.Itisidentiﬁedinthetablethat,
the job levels the users must reach in order to execute such
interaction models or tasks; the participant components that
Fig. 5 – The HealthAgents system architecture and resource access ﬂow control.
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Further discussion of the interaction model ‘‘Update case
proﬁle’’ and its speciﬁcation, based on this initial identiﬁca-
tion, will be given in the following sections.
4.3. Secure interaction models and Lightweight
Coordination Calculus (LCC)
Bearing in mind the fact that existing organisational structure
resists a common job level hierarchy, forcing different orga-
nisations to agree upon and change to the use of the same set
of job titles is not an option. A similar issue was seen in
managing user roles in local and global contexts. Mapping
individual users across Virtual Organisations (VOs) to local
database roles requires unnecessary but signiﬁcant mainte-
nance efforts for authorising resource access among multiple
sites. The solution of CAS, as discussed in Section 3.1, intro-
duces the mapping between VO roles and local database roles
and this technique is adopted here. We introduce a global
HealthAgents job title hierarchy and it is up to each individual
organisation to map their internal job title structure to the
items in the hierarchy. All security policies will be deﬁned
upon global job titles which will be mapped from individual
local job titles. Consequently, there is no need that all
participant organisations must assume the same set of job
titles in order to make the scheme work. At the same time,
a large number of mappings between clinicians to local job
titles are avoided. In Fig. 7, for example, 5 job titles in VO1 and
3 job titles in VO2 are mapped to 3 global items, correspond-
ingly. The mapping in VO2 is straightforward. In VO1, Levels
1&2 are mapped to a senior, Levels 3&4 to a principle, and
Level 5 to a trainee. It would also be possible to map Level 1 to
a senior, Levels 2&3 to a principle, and Levels 4&5 to a trainee.
It is a business decision to do mapping in one way or another
and grant access power to different levels according to the
business strategies.
AssumeintheglobalHealthAgentsjobtitlehierarchy,there
are three job titles, senior clinical consultant, principal clini-
cian, and trainee clinician, in that order, forms the existing
clinicalhierarchy,fromtoptobottom.Rolesinarole hierarchy
of RBAC have inheritance relationships. Likewise, a job title
higher up in the hierarchy inherits task execution privileges
from a job title further down in the hierarchy. Suppose the
following rules in HealthAgents restrict task availability.
Fig. 6 – The goal-decomposition graph for HealthAgents.
Table 1 – A high level view of selected interaction models.
Goal Sub-goals
(Interaction model)
Interaction
model privileges
Interaction
model
participants
Interaction model
constraints
Tumour type diagnosis Update case
proﬁle, etc.
N/A All N/A
Update case
proﬁle
Classify case Principle
clinicians or
above
GUI Agent, DB Agent,
Classiﬁer Agent, and
Classiﬁer Petitioner Agent
The clinician can
update the specialised
data areas
Classify case N/A Trainee
clinicians or
above
Classiﬁer Agent, and
Classiﬁer Petitioner Agent
The clinician must be a
workgroup member
taking care of the case
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new classiﬁers in the network and so are able to create
classiﬁers, using all public cases and local private cases.
  Rule2: Principal clinicians have primary healthcare
responsibilities and so are able to run classiﬁers, update
case proﬁles and diagnosis results, as well as update clas-
siﬁer reputation values.
  Rule3: Trainee clinicians assist in healthcare and can run
classiﬁers and be advised of classiﬁcation results.
Gaia (Wooldridge et al., 2000) is a methodology for agent-
oriented analysis and design, and has a view of a multi-agent
system as a computational organisation consisting of various
interacting roles. In Gaia, responsibilities and permissions are
uniﬁed in a single role notion. It is also recognised in Omicini
et al. (2005) that the coordination among agents/roles and
resources must enable authorisation policy speciﬁcation over
interaction speciﬁcation to achieve an expressive and safe
interaction model. Thus, role, interaction, and constraint
should be correlated. The descriptive interaction behaviour
which consists of message passing and constraint solving
have been deﬁned in Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC)
(Robertson, 2005) that can be transmitted, interpreted, and
executed by agents in the network. The LCC language has
been developed in the OpenKnowledge project (Robertson
et al., 2006) and it uses logic expression to regulate the
message exchange protocols among participant peers each of
which plays a particular role.
The LCC language combines role functions and constraints
in a single framework and this gives us the opportunity to
express permission enforcement prior to responsibility fulﬁl-
ment within role playing behaviour, in the context of running
interaction protocols. The following LCC clauses describe the
fundamental interaction pattern for resource access control.
aðresource request;PRIDÞ ::
requestðResource;Operation;ContextÞ0aðresource manager;RMIDÞ
aðresource manager;RMIDÞ ::
requestðResource;Operation;ContextÞ*aðresource request;PRIDÞ
)grantPermissionðPRID;Resource;Operation;Context;PoliciesÞthen 0
B B @
responseðGrant yesÞ0aðresource request;PRIDÞ
or
responseðResource resultÞ0aðresource request;PRIDÞ
)getOperationResultðResource;Operation;Access resultÞ
1
C C A
Brieﬂy, a(resource_request, RRID):: DefRRID and a(resource_-
manager, RMID):: DefRMID denotes that agents RRID and RMID
play the roles of resource_request and resource_manager
respectively as deﬁned in the deﬁnitions follow. DefRRID has
a single and DefRMID has a composite message passing
behaviour. In the above role deﬁnitions, a message of resource
access request is sent from the agent that plays the request
role to the agent that plays the manager role. Upon receipt of
this message, the resource manager agent applies appropriate
security policies and responds by sending back a message
either saying the request has been granted (or rejected) or by
providing the actual resources (or the results of their usage)
beingrequested. In the Def, )Consn denotesthat a constraint
must be satisﬁed (as some running code) before the clause
prior to it.
The notion a(id, role) deﬁnes the role a certain agent should
play and its identity can be bound with executable tasks,
workgroup memberships, and professional specialists at
runtime. The role playing behaviour deﬁnes the common
responsibilities an entitled user supposed to fulﬁl, being in
a position with/above a given title as are in Gaia, the organ-
isational roles in well-deﬁned positions associated with
expected behaviour. Then the memberships and professional
specialists further constrain the concrete resource usage in
the role’s interaction model participation, being identity-
speciﬁc and role-independent. This layered architecture is
discussed as follows, illustrated by a principal clinician
updating case proﬁle after classiﬁcation.
4.3.1. Level 1: interaction model constraints
The ﬁrst layer ﬁlters interaction model availability. A principal
clinician (possibly a GP) can load cases for which they have
caring responsibilities and later update its proﬁle (diagnosis
result, etc.). A junior clinician can perform classiﬁcation but
cannot do the update. Fig. 8 shows the interaction model. In
the diagram, messages ﬂow (represented by arrows) among
agents (represented by rounded-corner rectangles) which
digest and produce messages by playing roles (represented by
circles). The role playing behaviour in the interaction model is
as follows. In the beginning, a clinician requests patient data
for classiﬁcation. When the record is retrieved from database,
it is requested to a petitioner for classiﬁcation. Then, a set of
relevant classiﬁers will be executed upon the case, and ranked
classiﬁcation results will be sent back to the clinician for
decision support. After the real diagnosis result is known, the
patient record will be updated, as well as the reputation of the
executed classiﬁers.
The following LCC clauses show part of the speciﬁcation of
the interaction model. The clinician plays a role of classiﬁca-
tion (R1) and updatingcase proﬁle (R5). The role changeswhen
an accurate diagnosis result is known.
/*R1: classify a case */
a(clinician_classify, CID)::
requestCaseRecordByID(I)0a(database, DBID) then
caseRecord (R) *a(database, DBID) then
requestClassiﬁcation(R, C)0a(classiﬁer_petitioner, CPID)
then
classiﬁcationResults(S)*a(classiﬁer_petitioner, CPID) then
a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID)
/*R5: update case record and classiﬁer reputation following
diagnosis */
a(clinician_followingdiagnosis, CID)::
VO1 hierarchy
Level1 
Level2 
Level3 
Level4 
Level5 
Senior
Principle 
Trainee 
Level1
Level2
Level3
Global hierarchy VO2 hierarchy
Fig. 7 – Mapping between different organisation job levels
to those in a global hierarchy.
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then
caseRecordUpdated(Y)*a (database_update, DBID))
par
(updateClassiﬁer(I)0a(classiﬁer_petitioner, CPID) then
classiﬁerUpdated(Y)*a (classiﬁer_petitioner, CPID))
4.3.2. Level 2: case level constraints
An interaction model is uniquely deﬁned and its running
context varies, e.g. involved clinicians and cases. A resource
manager must check the request (resource and operation)
against the requester identity at runtime, in compliance with
the access policies. Speciﬁcally, the clinician must be
a memberofthe workgroup deliveringcareto theowner ofthe
case before the case is allowed to be updated, being a meta-
rule of healthcare access control. Additional local policy rule
satisfaction must also be considered for extra constraints, e.g.
a particular clinician can/cannot access particular resource
items. A generic security policy schema for healthcare is
described in Xiao et al. (2007) that can complement the meta-
rule with any number of speciﬁc policies. The following shows
the LCC constraints used by the database agent, being
a resource manager, for permission checking before the actual
role functions are carried out. The database agent issues
a case record (R2) and updates the same record (R6), different
levels of permissions being needed.
/*R2: send a case record for classiﬁcation */
a(database_download, DBID)::
requestCaseRecordByID(I)*a(clinician_classify, CID)
)grantPermission(CID, I, Read, Normal_classify_from_-
local_site, Local_database_read_policy_set) then
caseRecord(R)0a(clinician_classify, CID) ) getCaseR-
ecordByID(I, R) then
a(database_update, DBID)
/*R6: update a case record after classiﬁcation */
a(database_update, DBID)::
updateCaseRecordByID(I) *a(clinician_followingdiag-
nosis, CID)
)grantPermission(CID, I, Update, Normal_update_from_-
local_site, Local_database_update_policy_set) then
caseRecordUpdated (Y)0a(clinician_followingdiagnosis,
CID)
It is at the point of checking the LCC constraint of ‘‘grant-
Permission’’ that user workgroup and case will be related
(clinician identity of CID and case identity of I), and other
locally setread or update policiesapplied, prior to the required
operation. A clinician not in the right workgroup may be able
to download a case but cannot update it. The running and
execution of LCC speciﬁcation is supported by the Open-
Knowledge kernel.
4.3.3. Level 3: case partition constraints
Similarlywith level 2,a useridentity isbound with professional
specialists at runtime and this will constrain further permis-
sion to case partitions, e.g. only the named clinicians may
update or write major diagnosis results; certain specialists may
write reports in their areas; others on the case care list may
only read those areas. Thus, a three dimension resource
request of (user, resource, operation) will be constrained in two
dimensions: user-resource must match workgroup member-
ship and user-operation match job specialist.
The layered security model empowered by LCC running in
a distributed clinical environment, as discussed above, must
be able to enable interoperability if different clinical sites have
various ways of knowledge representation, e.g. different
languages may be used to describe their resources, database
schemas may vary from one dataset to another, policy
descriptions may be annotated differently with different
vocabularies. Even further, unless resource access requests
can be precisely understood by the system as well as the
corresponding related resources and associated regulation
policies in a single intelligent framework, users will experi-
ence frustration due to the lack of mapping and reasoning
capabilities in the system. We discuss in the following the
extra power our security model posses in an interoperable
environment offered by the HealthAgents domain ontology
and the Conceptual Graph approach.
Fig. 8 – Interaction Model: update case proﬁle (including case classiﬁcation).
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In the following we will focus on the problem of representing,
in a meaningful way, the knowledge involved in the Health-
Agents project and the resulting security mechanism. We
regard knowledge representation to be a (1) surrogate, (2) a set
of ontological commitments, (3) a fragmentary theory of
intelligent reasoning, (4) a medium for efﬁcient computation,
and (5) a medium of human expression. We will explain the
reasons why our choice of Conceptual Graphs (Sowa, 2000)i n
the contextofreconcilingdifferentperspectives ofthe domain
of discourse in reinforcing security rules.
The problem of representing healthcare information (e.g.
Electronic Healthcare Records, EHRs) about an individual has
been a key research ﬁeld in medical informatics for many
years. Such information (Iakovidis, 1998) (which can include
tests, observations, imaging information, diagnostics, patient
identiﬁcation, legal permissions) has either been stored in
a structured document based format (e.g. relational databases
etc.) or unstructured document based format (e.g. photo-
copied hard copies). EHRs are difﬁcult to represent, in
a consistent manner, due to their content complexity.
However, information, in this paper we follow the work of
Aamodt (2004) to distinguish between data, information and
knowledge, interoperability (Brown and Reynolds, 2000) will
beneﬁt pervasive patient care as it will allow for exchange of
data between multiple sites. This is important in the context
of this project where we expect hospitals from different parts
of the world to join the HealthAgents network and therefore,
make the security issues crucial in the project development
and the subsequent system deployment.
In order to address the interoperability shortcoming
a number of standards have been proposed in the literature. A
few examples that attempt to represent EHRs include Health
level 7, Davis et al. (1993), Openehr and Clunie (2000). The aim
is to structure the knowledge (using markup techniques) so
that the clinical content is precisely identiﬁed. The ability to
uniquely refer to a piece of information is denoted, in the
context of these standards, as ‘‘semantics’’ since it allows the
identiﬁcation of the meaning of the knowledge. In this paper,
however, we claim that this representation expressiveness is
not sufﬁcient for information retrieval. In the spirit of Mugnier
(2000) we deﬁne semantics as the capability of inferring
(reasoning) implicit knowledge from the knowledge base
(based on explicit knowledge and given rules). This is impor-
tant for HealthAgents as we seek to not only present infor-
mation, but indeed to understand the information – brain
tumour information could inﬂuence the patient diagnosis and
prognosis.
In HealthAgents we developed HADOM (HealthAgents
Domain Ontology) which conceptualises the parameters of
the employed techniques (MRI, MRS, DNA Microarrays, etc.),
the clinical information (age, sex, tumour location, etc.) and
the known brain tumour classes compliant to WHO (World
Health Organisation). For instance, the structure ‘‘medical
control’’ contains information related to different MRI, MRS,
etc. tests underwent by a patient. The HADOM ontology
provides a basic terminology for the HealthAgents database
schema and allows for interoperability at the terminological
level. This is illustrated in Fig. 9. Furthermore, for managing
security rules and appropriate reasoning we propose
a Conceptual Graph based description of the different inter
and intra hospital rules.
In HealthAgents we need to integrate medical knowledge
from different sites and retrieve it in an intelligent manner.
This retrieval has to be based on a set of rules that regulate the
accessto data.Theseruleshavebeenexplainedin fulldetailin
the previous sections. It is evident that we need a ﬂexible
mechanism for data representation and querying.
Primarily, the data in the HealthAgents system is stored in
relational databases at the various participating European
clinical centres. A uniform vocabulary needed for interoper-
ability reasons is provided by means of HADOM. The patient
concept is at the centre of HADOM (see Fig. 10(a)). Each visit of
a patient is given a unique ID to be differentiated from other
EHR regarding the same person. A particular patient instance,
therefore, has several associated patient records. Tissue focus
deﬁnes instances of the concerned areas under two sub
groups, namely Primary_Focus and Secondary_Focus. Patient
Record is linked up to main HADOM ontological concepts such
as Symptom, Diagnosis, Clinical Centre, Clinical Intervention,
Medical Control. This is visually represented in Fig. 10 by
directed links between the nodes representing the concepts.
Different colours have been solely used for visualisation
purposes and have no semantics. In Fig. 10(b) one visit of
a patient is depicted with the diagnosis further detailed by
Tumour Grade, Daumas Duport Grade, Region of Interest and
Histopathology. In both images the direction of arrows
represents how the information is accessed and the concepts
queried.A particular focus is relatedto the visit of a patient via
Patient_Record in HADOM (see Fig. 10(b)). Many medical
instruments and methods have been developed to diagnose
brain tumour. In HADOM, we enumerate the following
approaches and deﬁne them as sub-concepts of Medical_-
Control: Biopsy, HRMAS, Magnetic_Resonance and
Microarray.
The problem with representing EHRs in this format is that
certain rules that can help retrieve implicit knowledge are
hard to represent. Indeed, mutual understanding among
software agents is partially rooted in a commonly agreed
vocabulary/terminology in the brain tumour domain when
such agents need to communicate with each other to express
things like ‘‘retrieve cases of all patients under age 5’’ and
‘‘fetch a case of glioma from Hospital A’’ where underlined
words are concepts from HADOM. That is to say, the domain
ontology captures only the static model rather than the
inference procedures. We would like to be able to express
statements like ‘‘due to the fact that [.] the tumour is
malignant’’’ or ‘‘all peak areas with [.] characters suggest
[.]’’. Such separation (static model rather than inference
procedures) is based on both theoretical and practical
considerations. On the one hand, such inferences are built
using rules, machine learning techniques, etc. which,
currently, are not ready to be combined with major knowledge
representation and reasoning formalisms, e.g. Description
Logic, Frames, Entity-Relationship Model, etc. On the other
hand, a medical diagnosis is normally a complicated process
with ambiguity and uncertainty which cannot be entirely and
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nomic knowledge. This, however, does not deny the merit of
building a reasoning system on top of HADOM to provide
moderate suggestions and warnings to clinicians. Such
reasoning capability would be more appropriate to perform
simple and speciﬁc tasks. This sort of extra reasoning power
will also allow one to check for consistency within the
HealthAgents ontology.
The extra expressivity needs dictated by the necessity of
security rules that should be enforced let to the proposal of
using Conceptual Graphs for representing such rules. The
advantage of this approach primarily lies in the ease of match
checking between the local hospital rules and the global ones.
This is based on the querying mechanism for Conceptual
Graphs, projection, and will be described below. In the next
section we informally introduce Conceptual Graphs and
further explain our choice of knowledge representation
formalism also in the context of the ﬁve roles enumerated in
the previous Section.
4.5. Enhancing security model with inference: the
conceptual graphs approach
Conceptual Graphs represent background knowledge, i.e.
basic ontological knowledge, in a structure called support,
which is implicitly used in the representation of factual
knowledge as labelled graphs. A support consists of a concept
type hierarchy, a relation type hierarchy, a set of individual
markers that refer to speciﬁc concepts and a generic marker,
denoted by *, which refers to an unspeciﬁed concept. The
support deﬁnes the main concepts and relations that exist in
the world we are trying to describe. These concepts and
relations are going to be linked together by the means of an
ordered bipartite graph that will describe the facts we are
interested in. The ordered bipartite graph is going to represent
the ‘‘stencil’’ which is going to be ‘‘ﬁlled in’’ with the concepts/
relations taken from the support. A CG can be viewed as
a bipartite graph that provides a semantic set of pointers to
two ontologies. This means that we can reuse sources’
ontologies, database schemas etc. for the purpose of
describing those sources by the means of a CG. Moreover, the
attached semantics of Conceptual Graphs make them
a powerful reasoning knowledge representation and
reasoning formalism. CG reasoning mechanisms can be
viewed as a powerful tool for the querying process.
Layered Conceptual Graphs (LCGs for short) is a rigorously
deﬁned representation formalism evolved from Conceptual
Graphs. It allows highlighting a new type of rendering based
on the additional expansion of concept/relation nodes. This
way hierarchical knowledge can be represented in a mathe-
matically sound manner. The semantics associated with
layered conceptual graphs are based on the semantics of
conceptual graphs.
LCGs preserve the bipartite graph structure of the original
model by deﬁning transitional descriptions which allow
a successive construction of bipartite graphs. Unlike existing
approaches the knowledge detailed on a level of a hierarchy is
put in context by using descriptions for relation nodes as well.
A transitional description of a bipartite graph G provides a set
D of complex nodes in one of the classes of the bipartition,
each complex node having associated a description. Complex
nodes are visually depicted in bold. Their descriptions are
disjoint bipartite graphs. The neighbors of complex nodes
either have empty descriptions or are described as bipartite
graphs. These bipartite graphs contain in one of the classes of
the bipartition, (VC), all the atomic neighbors of the initial
graph. The remaining nodes in each of these classes are new
nodes or are taken from the descriptions of the corresponding
complex neighbors of the initial graph. In other words, if we
have a inter-connected world described by a CG and if we can
provide details about both some complex concepts and their
relationships, then we can construct a second level of
knowledge about this world, describing these new details as
Domain Ontology Domain Ontology
Schema 1 Schema i
Schema j
Schema n
Schema 1 Schema i
Schema j
Schema n
Fig. 9 – Ontological interoperability of HealthAgents
database schema.
Fig. 10 – Conceptual view of HealthAgents HADOM.
computers & security 29 (2010) 331–349 344Conceptual Graphs and applying the corresponding substitu-
tions. This process can be similarly performed with the last
constructed level, thus obtaining a coherent set of layered
representations of the initial world. We will use Layered
Conceptual Graphs for representing the policy rules and then
their associated ‘‘expansion’’ properties for highlighting the
interdependencies between such rules.
Fig. 11 depicts the support for our framework. Please note
that the support is not exhaustive, being intended for illus-
tration purposes only. The concept hierarchy is comprised of
the top, universal type, further reﬁned as a subject, resource,
policy rule or attribute. Policy rule is a stand alone concept as
one of our aims is to represent their interdependencies. The
agents are further specialised in database agent, classiﬁer
agent and yellow pages agent. The relation hierarchy is made
out of binary relations: access and attribute; and ternary
relations: associate. For simplicity reasons we only consider
two very generic access relations: managed and requests.
In Fig. 12 a bipartite graph is depicted for four policy rules.
The policy rules are depicted on the right hand side of the
picture while the subjects are represented on the left. To
increase readability the edges are not explicitly ordered in the
diagram. The bolded out nodes stand for complex nodes, that
is, nodes can be further expanded. The four agents from the
interaction are:
1. Clinical GUI Agent: the clinician, working in a given
hospital, requesting the d-DSS for a case to be classiﬁed. In
Fig. 12 we used the term ‘‘clinician’’ for clarity purposes.
2. Database Agent: gives access to the data from a given
hospital.
Fig. 11 – Support for the framework.
Fig. 12 – Example of rules.
}
Policy Rule: PR1
Database Agent: *
Clinician: *
associated
Clinician:*
Database Agent: *
Resource: *
Location: *
Location: *
hasAttribute
hasAttribute
access
managed
sameAs
Fig. 13 – Local Policy Rule.
computers & security 29 (2010) 331–349 3453. Classiﬁer Agent: a software that classiﬁes brain tumour
cases based on their characteristics (MRS spectra, case
meta-data, etc.)
4. Yellow Pages Agent.
The policy rules depicted in Fig. 12 address the following
scenarios:
PR1: A clinician wants to view data from a hospital.
PR2:A cliniciandirectlyasksa speciﬁcclassiﬁer fora caseto be
categorised.
PR3: A user asks the yellow pages for a classiﬁer and the
classiﬁer is found by the yellow pages.
PR4: Classiﬁers want to exchange information for
combination.
We return to the previous example to intuitively explain
our approach in this section. This section will only present the
rationale for the expressivity provided by the Conceptual
Graphs and detail the process of constraint matching.
aðresource request;RRIDÞ ::
requestðResource;Operation;ContextÞ0aðresource manager;RMIDÞ
aðresource manager;RMIDÞ ::
requestðResource;Operation;ContextÞ*aðresource request;PRIDÞ
)grantPermissionðRRID;Resource;Operation;Context;PoliciesÞthen 0
B B @
responseðGrant yesÞ0aðresource request;RRIDÞ
or
responseðResource resultÞ0aðresource request;RRIDÞ
)getOperationResultðResource;Operation;Access resultÞ
1
C C A
The constraint grantPermission(RRID, Resource, Operation,
Context, Policies) has to enforce that the resource requester
RRID will have access to perform certain operation on
a resource in a certain context based on certain policies. This
means that there has to be a matching between the policies
expressed on the intra level of the nodes in HealthAgents and
the local policies described in each particular node. More
precisely, we have to make sure that the logical formula
associated to the local security restrictions subsumes the
logical formula associated to the global restrictions applied for
that particular node. Note that the logical approach is impet-
uous:dueto thepotentialsize ofthesystemweneed tobeable
to modularise the access and furthermore, to be able to
automatically check for consistency.
The ‘‘grantPermission’’ will be satisﬁed by performing
matching between the two Conceptual Graphs associated to
the global rule and respectively the local rule. Let us consider
a simple scenario, namely the clinicians accessing data from
a hospital. We want to reinforce the fact that only clinicians
within the same hospital as the data have access to them. This
information is captured in Fig. 13. The bolded out nodes (the
relation node associates and the concept node policy rule) will
be expanded to capture this information in the Conceptual
Graph depicted at the bottom of the page. At length, Fig. 13
represents the fact that a clinician, which has a certain loca-
tion, is allowed to access a resource which is at the same
location as him and is managed by a database agent. This
information could be stored locally in one hospital as a local
security policy rule.
Consider the example presented in Fig. 14. On the left hand
side the local PR_1 policy rule graph is depicted. On the right
hand side we consider the query graph that wants to check if
Maurice, a user from Birmingham is allowed to request data
from Valencia. This could be the resource requester generated
by the LCC. Checking whether the rules allow for that access is
done by the means of projection, a labelled graph homomor-
phism between the query graph and the rules graph. More
precisely, the relation nodes are projected into relation nodes
and concept nodes into concept nodes. The structure of the
graph also has to be preserved. We can see that, in this
example, the answer to the query is ‘‘no’’. This is due to the
fact that the structure of the query graph does not match
the rule (more precisely, there is no ‘‘sameAs’’ relation in the
query graph). Please note that information from the support is
also considered while performing the projection. For example
the concept type user from the query graph has been pro-
jected onto the concept type clinician (according to the
concept type hierarchy). In the same way, according to the
relation hierarchy, the relation node request was projected
onto the relation node access.
2
5. Conclusions and discussion
In this paper, we have analysed the general security require-
ments for clinical information systems and developed
a layered security model, illustrated by its application to the
HealthAgents system but which is also applicable to other
healthcare systems. The interaction models being built will
Clinician:*
Database Agent: *
Resource: *
Location: *
Location: *
hasAttribute
hasAttribute
access
managed
sameAs
User:Maurice
request
Database Agent: 12
hasAttribute
hasAttribute
managed
Location: Bham
Location: Valencia
Resource:*
Fig. 14 – Local – Global Policy Rules Projection.
2 For a formal account of how Conceptual Graphs are deﬁned
and how the projection takes place see Croitoru and Compa-
tangelo (2006a,b).
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able to execute LCC protocols for interactions. Resource
manager agents will govern the resource requests against the
LCC constraints, reﬂecting clinical security policies. User
agents will be allowed to have access and perform only what
they need, reﬂecting their job responsibilities.
Themajorcontributionsandnoveltyoftheapproachisthat
it provides an enabling technology for bringing better knowl-
edge sharing capabilities among healthcare professionals in
a distributed environment and at the same time facilitating
better access control. No global user account repository is
required. Each clinician will get and only get the information
they need in a collaborative decision support environment.
Furthermore, our approach is enhanced with interoperability
andinferencecapabilitywiththeuseofadomainontologyand
the Conceptual Graph technique. This enables the application
of our model in clinical sites where resource and policy are
deﬁned in different languages. Overall, our healthcare knowl-
edge sharing and security enforcement solution will be useful
to large distributed clinical applications with separately
managed users, resources, and access policies.
Organisational structure and context association are key
assumptions to our privilege model. Organising authorisation
at user level cannot realise cooperation and inter-organisa-
tional communication in extended health networks, as stated
in Blobel (2004). The authors distinguish structural roles,
describing prerequisites or competencies for actions and
functional roles, being bound to the realisation of actions.
Such a conjunctional perspective of role is in accordance with
the privilege control in business processes and then their
contextual constraint. The semantic similarity of clinical user
group privileges and the business processes they can perform
is described in Chandramouli (2000). In additionto that, access
decisions need to be made on the exercise of privileges in
business processes depending upon contextual information.
Structuring business process (or task) context related
constraints, e.g. attending relation between physician and
patient as well as clinician speciality, as contextual parame-
ters to task execution that affect access control decisions is
expressed in (Hu and Weaver, 2004). Clinical task execution
privileges, therefore, should be distinguished, and repre-
sented by the privileges of running interaction models in our
approach. The layered security model authorises at a higher
level, the users’ task accessibility based on a static organisa-
tional structure and at a lower level, within task enactment,
users’ case and case partition accessibility based on dynamic
functional needs in order to perform tasks.
This inevitably avoids the occasion that a junior clinician
creates a classiﬁer of poor quality or updates a classiﬁer
reputation value improperly. Next, higher level business
function-based constraints are coupled with lower level
data-based constraints. A limited set of data, determined by
user workgroup memberships, will be allowed to be popu-
lated into the limited set of task functions. Finally, data-
based constrains are additionally coupled with operation-
based constraints. The available operations, determined by
job nature and specialists, will be allowed, e.g. write
(reports) or update (diagnosis results), upon particular data
sections. These constraints, as well as individually deﬁned
local policies, must be satisﬁed prior to interaction model
running. In sum, we constrain the availability of tasks to
users, case availability to tasks, and further operations
availability to cases, as the overall layered security archi-
tecture. The architecture is scalable since access rights are
precisely controlled by the combination of these dimen-
sions. For example, a senior pathologist doctor who is
responsible for a patient can update the pathology part of
this patient proﬁle but someone who is a senior pathologist
but not involved in caring for the patient cannot, or
someone who is a junior doctor, or someone who is not
specialised in pathology at all.
Noglobaluser accountrepositoryis requiredin oursystem.
The necessary interaction models are globally agreed. The
case to workgroup assignment is locally deﬁned and user to
workgroup possibly across organisations, for enabling inter-
action model running. When one user invokes an interaction
model and this involves resources from other sites, the
permission checking is determined by this user beinginvolved
in patient care or not, e.g. a remote clinician may perform
a classiﬁcation on behalf of a named doctor who is on holiday
and delegatesthe responsibility to this clinician, in emergency
situations, even the local hospital has not setup a local
account for the clinician.
Interaction models can be publicly accessible since the
descriptive interaction logic among peers reveals no secret
information itself and so no issue exists such as alternative
interaction model provision to certain users under certain
conditions. Rather, alternative resource peers may be selected
because the access to others is restrictive or, a subset or
related/alternative resource items from query returned to the
requester peer with a limited set of privileges. Such an auto-
nomic query relaxation paradigm, as part of our future work,
will avoid additional user interaction and frustrating experi-
ence. Another direction of future work is via monitoring
unsuccessful resource access, an interaction model adjust-
ment is advised if an access without satisfying constraints is
encountered but considered necessary. It may be useful to let
such requests be recorded and routed to responsible doctors
or other delegated authorisers who may or may not approve
the issuing of additional privileges, either permanently or
temporarily. With better understanding of the necessity of
such exceptional requests possibly after real life communi-
cation, critical and timely care aimed to patients will not be
compromised.
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